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Since its accession to the WTO on 11 December 2001, China has beeninvolved in eight cases as complainant, 23 as respondent, and 89 asa third party. (1)
Against all pre-entry predictions, the China related cases have not over-
burdened the WTO dispute settlement system, as if all parties were implic-
itly respecting a latent period before engaging in commercial hostilities.
Often portrayed as a “passive rule taker” (2) in the immediate aftermath of
its accession, China was not only learning by attentively watching other
members’ strategies, but was also benefiting from the benevolent attitude
of its main trading partners, the US and the EU. Moreover, its participation
in 89 WTO disputes as third party is not a trivial detail, (3) nor is it a sign of
passivity, but rather one of cautious preparation that corresponded to the
time needed to properly apprehend its new legal tools and all rights there
under. This strategic learning was rapidly evidenced by the novel official dis-
course on rights and obligations the Chinese leaders developed as a powerful
tactical instrument. As early as January 2003, at the Dispute Settlement
Body’s special session, the Chinese delegation to the WTO presented a
“communication” (4) aimed at the improvement of the “special and differ-
ential” provisions contained in the Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU), the WTO rules governing the settlement of disputes. An ambiguous
emerging super power, China was playing the developing country’s card (5)
in requesting a genuine special and differential (S&D) treatment to be in-
troduced in the DSU as it is in many other WTO legal instruments. (6) Re-
calling its commitment to engage in WTO activities and “play a positive
role in the formulation of multilateral trade rules, including rules concerning
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1. See Annex 1. The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), the rules governing the
settlement of disputes at the WTO provides for two major ways of resolving disputes: con-
sultation or negotiation and, if this first phase does not bring any outcome, adjudication
by panels and the Appellate Body (arbitration and good offices, conciliation and mediation
are also available but hardly been used). The DSU defines three categories of actors (all of
them being exclusively WTO Members): the complainants, the respondents and the third
parties. The role of third parties is not at all trivial. These WTO Members do influence the
settlement process from the consultation phase to the adoption of a decision by a consti-
tuted panel. The article 10 para2 of the DSU states: “Any Member having a substantial in-
terest in a matter before a panel and having notified its interest to the ‘Dispute Settlement
Body’ (DSB, referred to in this Understanding as a “third party”) shall have an opportunity
to be heard by the panel and to make written submissions to the panel. These submissions
shall also be given to the parties to the dispute and shall be reflected in the panel report.”
On third parties in WTO disputes, see, for instance, Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt,
“Three’s a Crowd: Third Parties and the WTO Dispute Settlement,” World Politics, vol. 58,
April 2006, pp. 446-477.
2. See, for example, Henry Gao, “Taming the Dragon, China’s Experience in the Dispute Settlement
System,” Legal Issues of Economic Integration, vol. 34, no. 4, 2007, pp. 369-392, and “China in
the WTO Dispute Settlement System: From Passive Rule-Taker to Active Rule-Maker,” in Ricardo
Meléndez-Ortiz et al. (eds.), A Decade in the WTO, Implications for China and Global Trade Gov-
ernance, ICTSD Programme on Global Economic Policy and Institutions, December 2011. 
3. In reference to the key role of third parties, supra note 1.
4. See TN/DS/W/29, 22 January 2003, “Improving the Special and Differential Provisions in the Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding,” Communication of the Permanent Mission of the People’s Re-
public of China.
5. China is indeed considered a developing country member. Interestingly, it has been a long tradition
for the GATT Contracting Parties and the WTO Members to self-declare their status as developed
or developing countries. 
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dispute settlement mechanism,” (7) China proposed the reinforcement of
the S&D treatment for developing countries and precisely the following key
reforms:
(a) Developed-country Members shall exercise due restraint in cases
against developing-country Members. For instance, developed-country
Members shall not bring more than two cases to the WTO Dispute Set-
tlement Body against a particular developing-country Member within
a calendar year.
(b) Where a developed-country Member brings a case against a develop-
ing-country Member, if the final rulings of a panel or the Appellate Body
show that a developing-country Member does not violate its obliga-
tions under the WTO Agreements, the legal costs of the developing-
country Member shall be borne by the developed-country Member
initiating the dispute settlement proceedings.
(c) Developed-country Members shall help developing-country Members
participate in the dispute settlement mechanism in a more effective
way through providing technical assistance and capacity building pro-
grammes. (8)
As a Recently Acceded Member (RAM) and diligent student in interna-
tional trade, China was testing other members’ readiness to interpret its
Protocol of Accession (9) and bring disputes as well as the available strategies
to influence the flow and pace of these potential cases. An active learner
and rules negotiator during the first seven years of its participation, Beijing
progressively matured into a more offensive player while it brought 6 new
cases as complainant between 2008 and today.
Chicken, tires, paper, steel, distribution rights, intellectual property, or solar
panel, the China related disputes cover all possible areas of international
trade (10) and directly address the interpretation of China’s unique Protocol
of accession. But one also finds rapidly that the vast majority of cases – and
cases to come – deal with anti-dumping measures adopted in reaction to
what is often perceived, in Europe and the US, but also increasingly in the
developing world, as unfair trade.
There are many ways of approaching an already vast body of decisions
and related legal and economic literature. To better reflect the uniqueness
of the Chinese trade regime and the impact of such a peculiar mix between
economic liberalisation and maintenance of the state on other WTO mem-
bers, I have chosen to focus on three singular aspects now emerging from
the settled disputes: the transitional product specific safeguard measures
adopted in reaction to a market disruption caused by Chinese imports, the
antidumping and countervailing duties issue, and the restrictions on exports
or imports imposed by China for economic, but also societal and political
reasons.
Transitional product safeguard measures and
China’s protocol of accession interpretation
WTO-plus and WTO-minus rights and obligations
China’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO was and remains unique in that
it includes a number of special or WTO-plus commitments as well as WTO-
minus rights. (11) Like all other new Members to the WTO, China has under-
taken a series of traditional WTO commitments on market access and rules.
Unlike other accessions, however, China has not only accepted extensive
market access commitments, but also a number of specific rules that are
now largely criticised by its officials and trade experts. (12) The WTO-plus
commitments impose stricter disciplines than generally required by the
WTO agreement, while the WTO-minus provisions allow other WTO mem-
bers to take protective measures against Chinese exports that deviate from
general WTO disciplines. Lastly, China’s Protocol of Accession prevents China
from seeking S&D treatment in the same way as other developing countries
members.
The WTO-plus commitments include the following elements:
1. “Rule of Law” obligations related to the establishment of a more trans-
parent trade regime as well as the judicial review and uniform admin-
istration of trade. Adopted in relation to article  X of GATT  94
(Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations), these provisions
remain a major obstacle to the genuine application of China’s WTO
commitments. (13)
2. Obligation to progressively practice a market economy: While WTO
rules assume a market economy, nothing in the Agreement prescribes
the participation of non-market economies (NME). China’s Protocol of
Accession, in contrast to what is (not) imposed on other members, es-
tablishes special market economy obligations for China. Beijing is indeed
obliged to allow the market to determine prices for a number of do-
mestic goods and is prohibited from using price controls except for
specifically listed categories of products. (14) Moreover, China should lib-
eralise foreign trading rights and not influence the decisions of State
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6. The “Special and Differential Treatment” granted to the WTO developing Members finds its roots
in the Preamble of the WTO Agreement with the “need for positive efforts designed to ensure
that developing counties […] secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate
with the needs of their economic development.” The special and differential treatment provisions
can take many forms (safeguards, flexibility, transitional periods, protection of infant industry,
etc) and have to be explained agreement by agreement. See generally the work of the WTO Trade
and Development Committee, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_
provisions_e.htm (consulted on 25 February 2012); and for an excellent synthesis of the main
components of this treatment, Peter van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Or-
ganisation, (second edition), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 723-730.
7. See TN/DS/W/29, 22 January 2003, art. cit.
8. Ibid. p. 1. The Doha Ministerial Declaration mandates negotiations on improvements and clarifi-
cations of the DSU. The Chinese proposal aimed at this objective. The Doha negotiation cycle hav-
ing not been concluded, these proposals could not be furthered. See www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dda_e/dohasubjects_e.htm (consulted on 25 February 2012).
9. According to its Protocol of accession to the WTO, China cannot benefit from the special and dif-
ferential treatment as other developing countries members. See Protocol of Accession of the Re-
public of China to the WTO (WT/L/432), 10 November 2001, and the incorporated paragraphs of
its Working Party Report (WT/ACC/CHN/49).
10. See Annex 1: WTO Disputes Cases involving China. For an interesting map of the Chinese disputes,
see as well the WTO website, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_maps_e.htm?coun-
try_selected=CHN&sense=e (consulted on 24 February 2012).
11. On China’s accession to the WTO, see Leïla Choukroune and Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “China’s ac-
cession to the WTO: a Turning Point?” and “Rule of Law Through Internationalisation, The Objective
of the Reforms?,” China Perspectives, no. 40, March-April 2002, pp. 4-6 and 7-20, and Leïla
Choukroune, “China’s Accession to the WTO and Legal Reform: Towards the Rule of Law via Inter-
nationalization without Democracy,” in Pierre-Étienne Will and Mireille Delmas-Marty (eds.),
China, Democracy and Law, Leiden, Brill, 2012.
12. We have recently seen an explosion of “academic” and/or official articles denouncing the unfair-
ness of China’s Protocol. See, for instance, Xiaohui Wu, “No Longer Outside, not yet Inside: Re-
thinking China’s Membership into the WTO,” Chinese Journal of International Law, vol. 10, 2011,
pp. 227-270, www.chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/10/2/227.full.pdf (consulted on 6 March
2012).
13. See our contribution to this special issue, Leïla Choukroune, “The Compromised Rule of Law by
Internationalisation.”
14. See China’s Protocol of Accession, paragraph 9.
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Owned Enterprises (SOEs). (15) This, of course, is particularly tricky to
implement in a “socialist market economy” in which the role of the
state is still very pervasive. (16) As we will see below, a number of recent
disputes are precisely related to this ambiguous obligation and the sim-
ilarly ambiguous Chinese economic and political position.
3. Obligations to eliminate export tariffs: In a departure from the WTO
general rule allowing Members to levy taxes and charges on their ex-
ports, China is required to “eliminate(s) all taxes and charges applied to
exports except for those specifically provided in the Annex 6 of the Pro-
tocol”. (17)
4. Special obligations on foreign investment: Here again, the China Proto-
col departs from normal WTO disciplines. China, for instance – and this
is very controversial today – may not make approval of foreign invest-
ment conditional upon the existence of domestic competitors or, more
importantly, on any performance requirement including technology
transfer or obligations to conduct research and development activities
in China. (18) Furthermore, foreign investors and foreign owned enter-
prises are entitled to National Treatment with respect to all their China
activities.
5. Additional Transitional Review Mechanisms: A special transitional review
mechanism (19) was established by the Chinese Protocol to review
China’s implementation every year during the first eight years after ac-
cession as well as on year ten. This special scrutiny regime was unique
and additional to the usual trade policy reviews conducted for all WTO
Members at regular intervals.
WTO-minus provisions cover the following issues:
1. Special anti-subsidy rules: China’s Protocol permits an importing WTO
Member to use non-market economy (NME) methodologies to calcu-
late Chinese subsidies and possibly take measures against them. This is
not subject to a time limit. There are also special rules for government
subsidies to State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that again departs from
normal WTO rules. These include an additional ownership criterion
when defining the specificity of government/public support. Under this
criterion, subsidies granted to Chinese SOEs are considered to satisfy
the requirement of specificity, thus making them actionable under WTO
rules on subsidies. Curiously, China is not allowed to make use of a very
interesting WTO provision allowing developing countries to provide
subsidy to companies that are directly linked to a privatisation pro-
gramme, even though one could imagine such a rule would promote
the existing privatisation policy for Chinese SOEs. The lack of coherence
in these measures makes application of China’s Protocol of Accession
more difficult.
2. Special anti-dumping rules. China’s Protocol allows WTO Members to
treat China as a non-market economy (NME) for 15 years, that is until
2016. (20) In WTO law, dumping is determined (21) when a product is ex-
ported at less than its “normal value” and causes or threatens to cause
material injury to an industry of the importing country. As long as China
is considered a NME, importing WTO Members can argue that the Chi-
nese domestic prices cannot be used to assess the dumping margin and
that generally higher priced equivalents in a third country should be
used. As we will see in the below developments, tensions over the NME
status of China seem set to continue, as there is no clear definition of
a non-market economy in WTO law, and WTO Members applying anti-
dumping measures have the right to determine whether the exporting
country is or is not a market economy. China is likely to see itself as a
victim of unfair anti-dumping methodologies, while the EU and US, as
well as other emerging players, will more often target China for anti-
dumping measures. It is equally easy to understand why China is push-
ing the EU and the US to obtain a market economy status that could
clarify its situation and so the methodologies used to determine and
assess dumping.
3. Special safeguards regime: The China Protocol contains a special set of
safeguard provisions in addition to the existing WTO safeguard regime
that can be invoked until 2013. WTO members can apply safeguards
selectively against products of Chinese origin if they can show “market
disruption” and “causality” with increased imports, an easier test than
the normal injury test for safeguards under the WTO. Furthermore, an
importing country does not even have to prove the “injury” and “causal
link” if it argues that there is “trade diversion” as a result of another
member’s safeguards against China. One can clearly see the risks of this
sort of spillover effects. There was also a special safeguard mechanism
applicable to textile and clothing products of Chinese origin up to 2008.
This allowed WTO members to impose quotas if they could show that
imports of Chinese textile and clothing products caused “market dis-
ruption, threatening to impede the orderly development of trade in
these products.” This safeguard provided the basis for bilateral textile
agreements between China and the EU and US in 2005. Of course, these
rules were accepted by China during the course of the WTO accession
negotiations, but as illustrated by the below disputes, they are ex-
tremely difficult to implement for both technical and political reasons.
The Safeguards Battle
The DS 399 (22) case deals with a transitional product-specific safeguard
measure (the tyres measures) adopted under paragraph 16 of China’s Pro-
tocol of Accession and applied on US imports from China of certain pas-
senger vehicle and light truck tyres pursuant to Section 421 of the US Trade
Act of 1974 (China Safeguards Investigations). (23)
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15. See China’s Protocol of Accession, paragraph 5 (1).
16. On the intertwined relations between the state and the economy, see for instance The Economist
recent comparative study: The Economist, The Rise of State Capitalism, The Emerging World’s New
Model, January 21st-27th 2012. 
17. See China’s Protocol of Accession, paragraph 11 (3).
18. See China’s Protocol of Accession, paragraph 7 (3).
19. See China’s Protocol of Accession, paragraph 18.
20. See China’s Protocol of Accession, paragraph 15.
21. See Article VI of GATT 1994 and the Anti-dumping Agreement.
22. See www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds399_e.htm (consulted on 25 February
2012).
23. See United States International Trade Commission (USITC) at www.usitc.gov/press_room/us_safe-
guard.htm (consulted on 25 February 2012). Under Section 421 of the 1974 Trade Act, the USITC
determines whether imports of a product from China “are being imported into the United States
in such increased quantities or under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause market
disruption to the domestic producers of like or directly competitive products.” If so, a remedy is
proposed by the Commission. The Commission sends its report to the American President and the
U.S. Trade Representative. The President makes the final remedy decision.
Leïla Choukroune – China and the WTO Dispute Settlement System
Interestingly, this case highlights the interplay between public and private
actors and the lobbying power of national interest groups at a time of “dein-
dustrialisation” and economic crisis. On 20 April 2009 indeed, a petition was
filed by the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy,
Allied Industrial and Service workers International Union (the USW) request-
ing the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) to determine
that light truck tyres from China were being imported in such a way to
cause or threaten to cause market disruption. On 24 April 2009 an investi-
gation was instituted by the USITC and determined that there was indeed
a market disruption as a result of rapidly increasing imports of quantities
of Chinese tyres causing domestic injury to the domestic industry. A remedy
was found and, as per the 1974 Trade Act procedure, a Presidential decision
taking effect on 26 September 2009 allowed additional duties to be im-
posed on imports of tyres from China for a three-year period (35 percent
ad valorem for the first year, 30 percent ad valorem for the second year and
25 percent ad valorem for the third year). In reaction to these measures,
China made seven specific claims in relation to paragraph 16 (Transitional
Product-Specific Safeguard Mechanism) of its Protocol of Accession and
GATT 94: The US failed to evaluate whether imports from China are in “such
increased quantities” and “increased rapidly” as required by 16.1 and 16.4
of the Protocol. (24)
The US Statute implementing the causation standard of Paragraph 16 in
to US Law was inconsistent “as such” with Paragraphs 16.1 and 16.4 of the
Protocol. 
- The US failed to evaluate properly whether imports from China were a
“Significant Cause” as required by the paragraph 16.1 and 16.4 of the
Protocol. 
- The US Statute implementing the causation standard of paragraph 16
into US law was inconsistent “as such” with paragraphs 16.1 and 16.4 of
the Protocol.
- The US failed to evaluate if imports from China were a significant cause
as required by paragraph 16.1 and 16.4 of the Protocol.
- The US imposed a transitional safeguard measure that went beyond the
“extent necessary” and was thus inconsistent with paragraph 16.3 of the
Protocol. 
- The US imposed a three-year safeguard period that went beyond the
“necessary” period of time and was hence inconsistent with paragraph
16.6 of the Protocol. 
- The transitional safeguard measure was inconsistent with Article I:1
(Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment) of the GATT 94, as the US did not ac-
cord the same treatment to Chinese imports as it does to other countries
imports 
- The transitional safeguard measure is inconsistent with Article II:1 (b)
(Schedules of Concessions) of the GATT 94 as the tariffs consist of un-
justified modifications of US concessions on passenger vehicles and light
truck tyres under the GATT 94. 
Naturally, China asked the WTO Panel to recommend that the US
promptly comply with its WTO obligations and so withdraw the challenged
measure, while the US asked the Panel to reject China’s claims in their en-
tirety. After the panel rejected all of China claims under paragraph 16 of its
Protocol of Accession and GATT 94 and concluded that the US did not fail
to comply with its obligations, China appealed the decision. However, China
did not appeal a number of findings by the Panel, specifically the following
elements: the US measure did not exceed the extent and the period of time
necessary to prevent or remedy the market disruption, and the US causation
standard in Section 421 of the 1974 Trade Act was not inconsistent with
the Section 16 of the Chinese Protocol of Accession.
In its reasoning, the WTO Appellate Body (AB) grasped the opportunity
of this case to clarify the relationship between the Chinese Protocol of Ac-
cession and other WTO Agreements: within the meaning of the Article 31(1)
and (2) of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, (25) the WTO Agree-
ments serving as a contextual reference for the interpretation of the Proto-
col of Accession and in this case paragraph 16. In interpreting the meaning
of the term “significant cause” included in paragraph 16, the AB also shed
light on the rigorous character of the Chinese Protocol in comparison with
other WTO safeguard-related measures. Interestingly as well, the AB rejected
a quite ambitious argument from the Chinese side: China indeed tried to
demonstrate that the Panel failed to conduct an “objective assessment of
the matter” as required under the Article 11 of the DSU (Function of Panels).
To do so, China attempted to show that the Panel failed to consider the to-
tality of the evidence on the question of causation. Having considered all
Chinese arguments, the AB upheld the Panel findings. 
This apparently technical and somehow limited case provides a particu-
larly clear illustration of the subtle, yet demanding, drafting of the Chinese
Protocol. Well protected against market disruptions caused by Chinese im-
ports until 2013, the WTO Members will have to adjust their strategies and
legal defences to the rapidly evolving new commercial done that will de-
velop in a less rigorous environment. 
Non market economy, antidumping, and
countervailing duties: The complicated
equation
Unfair Trade
Unfair trade can take many forms from the fixation of prices to monop-
olies and cartels, but under the WTO Agreements, one generally refers to
the issues of dumping and subsidisation, two quite common practices con-
sidered, in the limits defined by the WTO, as unfair. As surprising as it may
seem to the non-trade lawyer, dumping and subsidisation are not prohibited
in WTO law. However, dumping is “condemned” if it causes an injury to the
domestic industry, while in a more complex fashion, subsidies are either
prohibited or may be challenged when they cause adverse effects to the in-
terests of other members. (26) The dumping issue is covered by the Agree-
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24. See Annex 2, paragraph 16 of China's Protocol of Accession.
25. Article 31 General rule of interpretation
1.  A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the
text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was
made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument
which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and ac-
cepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 12(a) any subsequent agreement
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of
the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in
the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
Source: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/1_1.htm (consulted on 25 February 2012).
26. For a lucid introduction to these particularly complex and controversial issues, see Peter van den
Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation, supra note 6, pp. 507-605.
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ment on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 known as the
Antidumping Agreement (27) (AD), and the Subsidies question is framed by
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). (28)
The Chinese Protocol of Accession complicated an already detailed and
complex picture. Indeed, paragraph 15 of the Protocol sets specific rules for
price comparability in determining subsidies (29) and dumping: 
(a) In determining price comparability under Article VI of the GATT 1994
and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the importing WTO Member shall
use either Chinese prices or costs for the industry under investigation
or a methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with do-
mestic prices or costs in China based on the following rules:30
(i) If the producers under investigation can clearly show that market
economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the like product
with regard to the manufacture, production and sale of that product,
the importing WTO Member shall use Chinese prices or costs for the
industry under investigation in determining price comparability;
(ii) The importing WTO Member may use a methodology that is not
based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China if
the producers under investigation cannot clearly show that market
economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the like product
with regard to manufacture, production and sale of that product.
(b) In proceedings under Parts II, III and V of the SCM Agreement, when ad-
dressing subsidies described in Articles 14(a), 14(b), 14(c) and 14(d), rel-
evant provisions of the SCM Agreement shall apply; however, if there are
special difficulties in that application, the importing WTO Member may
then use methodologies for identifying and measuring the subsidy ben-
efit which take into account the possibility that prevailing terms and
conditions in China may not always be available as appropriate bench-
marks. In applying such methodologies, where practicable, the importing
WTO Member should adjust such prevailing terms and conditions before
considering the use of terms and conditions prevailing outside China.
As demonstrated by the above reproduced subparagraphs (a) and (b) of
paragraph 15 of the Chinese Protocol, the methodologies applied to China
depart from the general WTO methodologies used in anti-dumping and sub-
sidy investigations. The main justification for this exceptional approach is
based on the specificity of the Chinese “socialist market economy” in which
the state is still very much prevalent through a number of possible inter-
ventions in the economy from special loans to subsidies and SOEs. This un-
usual and somehow vague approach is nevertheless framed by the need for
importing WTO Members to notify “methodologies used” to the “Commit-
tee on Anti-Dumping Practices and the Committee on Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Measures.” Lastly, the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be
terminated “once China has established, under the national law of the im-
porting WTO Member that it is a market economy (…) provided that the
importing Member’s national law contains market economy criteria as of
the date of accession. In any event, the provisions of the subparagraph (a)(ii)
shall expire 15 years after the date of accession.” (31)
Two recent cases provide a very detailed illustration of the difficulty WTO
Members are now facing in the interpretation and implementation of the
anti-dumping and subsidies provisions.
In the first case (DS 379), (32) in 2007, the United States Department of
Commerce (USDOC) reversed its policy and decided that its countervailing
legislation would apply to the Chinese economy, which while still not a mar-
ket economy has undergone sufficient economic reform as to enable the
USDOC to identify and countervail subsidies granted by the Chinese Gov-
ernment. On 19 September 2008, in reaction to this quite surprising decision
(in anti-dumping investigations the USDOC continues to treat China as a
non-market economy), China requested consultations with the US with re-
spect to definitive anti-dumping and countervailing duties imposed by
Washington on imports of four products from China. In the second case (DS
397),33 on 31 July 2009, China requested consultations with the European
Union regarding Article 9(5) of Council Regulation (EC) no. 384/96 of De-
cember 1995 dealing with protection against dumped imports from non-
EU Members countries, as amended, and Council Regulation (EC)
no. 91/2009 of 26 January 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty
on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating from China. Here
again, China challenged the complex EU methodology as applied to a non-
market economy.
Beyond the technical considerations on anti-dumping and subsidies in-
vestigations methodologies applicable to a non-market economy, the panels
and Appellate Body have touched upon, and to a certain extend clarified, a
crucial concept, that of a “Public Body,” hence further delimiting the con-
tours of the state’s intervention in international trade.
Public Body
In the US- Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain
Products from China (DS 379), China in fact appealed the Panel’s interpre-
tation and application of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement and chal-
lenged the Panel’s finding that the term “public body” means “any entity
controlled by a government.” In the same perspective, China took issue with
the Panel’s interpretative approach and acted inconsistently with the DSU
in its interpretation techniques and reliance on municipal law. To this we
should add that the Chinese Protocol gives a particularly precise definition
of the subsidies provided to SOEs. Paragraph 10 of the Chinese Protocol
states the following:
1. China shall notify the WTO of any subsidy within the meaning of Article 1
of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM
Agreement”), granted or maintained in its territory, organized by specific
product, including those subsidies defined in Article 3 of the SCM Agree-
ment. The information provided should be as specific as possible, follow-
ing the requirements of the questionnaire on subsidies as noted in Article
25 of the SCM Agreement.
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27. See www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm (consulted on 25 February 2012).
28. See www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm_01_e.htm (consulted on 25 February 2012).
29. On the arduous question of subsidies in the Chinese Protocol of accession, see Julia Ya Qin, “WTO
Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs): A Critical Appraisal of the China Ac-
cession Protocol,” Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, vol. 7,
no. 4, 2004, pp. 863-919.
30. Highlighted in bold by the author.
31. China’s Protocol of Accession, paragraph 15 (d). The paragraph is concluded with the following
elements: “In addition, should China establish, pursuant to the national law of the importing WTO
Member, that market economy conditions prevail in a particular industry or sector, the non-market
economy provisions of subparagraph (a) shall no longer apply to that industry or sector.”
32. See www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds379_e.htm (consulted on 25 February 2012).
33. See www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds397_e.htm (consulted on 25 February 2012).
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2. For purposes of applying Articles 1.2 and 2 of the SCM Agreement, sub-
sidies provided to state-owned enterprises will be viewed as specific if,
inter alia, state-owned enterprises are the predominant recipients of such
subsidies or state-owned enterprises receive disproportionately large
amounts of such subsidies. (34)
3. China shall eliminate all subsidy programmes falling within the scope of
Article 3 of the SCM Agreement upon accession.
And this is precisely the specificity of the subsidies granted to Chinese
SOEs that allows WTO Members to challenge them. Indeed, WTO rules on
subsidies do not apply to all “financial contributions by a government that
confer a benefit,” that is to all subsidies, but only to specific ones. (35)
Departing from the panel’s findings, the Appellate Body considered the
meaning of the term “public body” in accordance with Article 31 (general
rules if interpretation) of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties,
and while it found that the concept of “public body” shared a number of
attributes with the concept of “government,” it found, as well, that the
object and purpose of the SCM Agreement do not favour either a broad
or a narrow interpretation of this term. Taking also into consideration the
International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for In-
ternationally Wrongful Acts, the AB concluded that the concept of “public
body” is an entity that possesses, exercises, or is vested with governmental
authority. Yet, the AB made clear that this definition may vary from state
to state and case to case. Based on its interpretation of the term “public
body,” the AB reversed the Panel’s finding that the term public body means
“any entity controlled by a government.” The AB was then able to com-
plete its analysis with regard to the Chinese SOEs in the four companies
at issue, which were producers of steel, rubber, and petrochemical com-
ponents sold to the investigated companies or to trading companies. In-
deed, the US administration had based its analysis of the “public body”
concept on the majority state ownership of the companies. The AB con-
sidered in this regard that evidence of government ownership is not in it-
self evidence of control of an entity by the government and cannot as
such serve as a proof for establishing that the entity is vested with the
needed authority to perform a government function and so is a “public
body.” On the contrary, the AB found that state-owned commercial banks
(SOCBs) were public bodies under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement
as other evidences relating to the Chinese government role in the banking
sector could be considered.
As sophisticated as it is, this demonstration and the many AB decisions
on the methodological intricacies of the determination of dumping and sub-
sidisation may soon be challenged in other AD and countervailing cases,
not only by the EU or the US, but also by China itself. In a fascinating parallel
reaction indeed, China is also imposing AD measures on other members
products, already leading to a number of new cases brought by the US in
the past two years. In September 2010, the US initiated a WTO case chal-
lenging the anti-dumping and countervailing duties China imposed on im-
ports of “Grain Oriented Flat Rolled Electrical Steel” (DS 414). (36) In
September 2011, the US brought another WTO claim challenging the an-
tidumping and countervailing duties China imposed on imports of certain
American chicken products known as “broiler” products (DS 427). (37, 38) The
issue at stake is mainly that of transparency. Upon accession to the WTO,
China has issued a large number of new rules bringing its former regulations
into conformity with the WTO regime, but Beijing still needs to improve its
transparency-related requirements and to better notification of its an-
tidumping (AD) related measures and reforms.
Restrictions on imports and exports
Another fundamental question is progressively emerging from the recently
concluded disputes. Although fragmented in quite different cases, the con-
cept of state restrictions on imports and exports for economic, but also po-
litical and societal issues is now evidenced by several decisions. We will pay
particular attention – although too rapidly due to the length limitations of
this article – to two disputes: China Measures Affecting Trading Rights and
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audio-visual Entertain-
ment Products (DS 363), (39) and China Measure Related to the Exportation
of Various Raw Materials (DS 394/DS 395/ DS 398). (40)
In the Audio-visual Entertainment Products case, the dispute dealt with a
complaint brought by the US with respect to various measures relating to
the importation into and distribution within China of reading materials,
audio-visual home entertainment products, sound recordings, and films for
release in movie theatres. (41) In reaction to the American claims, China ar-
gued in favour of the specificity of cultural goods and the need to review
their content in the view of possible impact on public morals. The disguised
Chinese censorship was however found inconsistent with China’s trading
rights commitments contained in paragraph 5 (1) of the Protocol of Acces-
sion and paragraphs 83(d) and 84 (a) and (b) of the Report of the Working
Party on China’s accession. Under these provisions, all Chinese enterprises,
as well as foreign enterprises and individuals, are to be granted, within three
years of accession, the right to import and export all goods in a non-discre-
tionary manner. Not to mention that the Chinese restrictions were incon-
sistent with China’s schedules of commitments on market access (a list of
open services) or national treatment under Articles XVI and XVII of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Moreover, in a brilliant technical
demonstration, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel findings that China’s
use of Article XX (a) of the GATT 94 (General Exceptions) was not convinc-
ing. (42) Beijing indeed tried to demonstrate that the “public morals” excep-
tion of GATT 94 Article XX (a) could justify its measures, but it failed to
prove the “necessary” character of such exception.
In the Raw Materials dispute, cases were brought against China in relation
to the four types of export restraint it imposed on the exports of various
raw materials (bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, silicon
metal, yellow phosphorus, and zinc). Having in mind the unquenched thirst
of China for commodities and natural resources, this dispute resounds in a
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34. Highlighted in bold by the author.
35. Cf. Article 1.2 of the SCM Agreement: “A subsidy as defined in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the
provisions of Part II or shall be subject to the provisions of part III or V only if such a subsidy is
specific in accordance with provisions of article 2.”
36. See www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds414_e.htm (consulted on 6 March 2012).
37. See www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds427_e.htm (consulted on 6 March 2012).
38. See as well the last USTR evaluation of China’s WTO Commitments implementation. USTR, 2011
Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance. 
39. See www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds363_e.htm (consulted on 6 March 2012).
40. See www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds398_e.htm (consulted on 6 March 2012).
41. See the articles of Rogier Creemers and Bryan Mercurio in this special issue.
42. The Article XX (a) of GATT 94 reads as follow: “Subject to the requirement that such measures
are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrim-
ination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on inter-
national trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party of measures: (a) necessary to protect public morals; […].”
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peculiar way. The Complainants argued that the use of export restraints cre-
ates scarcity and causes higher prices of raw materials in global markets as
well as providing China’s domestic industry with an unfair advantage by
way of sufficient supply and thus cheaper prices. Upon accession to the
WTO, China agreed, as we have seen, to eliminate all exports taxes and
charges and all export quotas. But here again, China tried to use the general
trade exceptions contained in GATT 94 Article XX (b) (exception “necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health”) and (g) (exception “relat-
ing to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production
or consumption”) to support its restrictive measures. The Appellate Body
nevertheless upheld the Panel’s finding that there is no basis in China’s Ac-
cession Protocol to allow the application of Article XX of the GATT 1994 to
China’s obligations under Paragraph 11.3 of the Accession Protocol (Taxes
and Charges levied on Exports and Imports) and found that China cannot
have recourse to Article XX to justify a breach of its obligation to eliminate
export duties.
While similar cases are likely to appear in the near future, these disputes
are quite revealing of China’s internal needs and struggles between the im-
perative of export-oriented growth and the political strategic choices Bei-
jing’s leaders have made to build up and consolidate their vision of a
developed yet not autonomous society.
Conclusion
Ten years ago, a dispute between China and Japan over Japanese safe-
guard measures against three agricultural products from China gave an
early indication of Beijing’s determination to put its new legal arsenal to
good use. China was not yet a member of WTO, but both parties fre-
quently referred to the WTO agreements in their legal arguments. A few
months later, in 2002, China grabbed the attention of trade lawyers with
its provisional safeguard measures with respect to certain American steel
products. These came less than six months after China adopted legislation
on safeguards, causing some experts to qualify Beijing’s attitude as “ag-
gressive legalism.”
A wise observer and fast learner in global trade, China is now able to put
its recently acquired knowledge into practice and will undoubtedly bring
new claims against its main trading partners while these same partners will
follow the pace of global trade and more often target China. Interestingly,
these novel trade disputes may not be fought by the EU or the US, but
rather by emerging economies such as Brazil or India. With the recent im-
position of a 30 percentage point tax increase on cars with less than 65
percent local content, the Brazilian government firmly reacted to the sig-
nificant imports of Chinese cars and the risk of seeing the country “de-in-
dustrialise.” Following Tata Motors’ announcements, other foreign cars
companies may decide to build up car factories in Brazil, hence avoiding
high taxes, but this may also result in a major WTO dispute as Brazilian –
as well as Indian – Industrialists seem to distinguish between Chinese and
other trade competitors. Having emerging or developing countries fighting
against each other at the WTO is not something new. India, for instance,
has brought a number of complaints against Brazil, Argentina, and South
Africa, but something else is at stake today. Many of these emerging trade
champions are, to a very large (China) or much smaller extent (Brazil), “State
Capitalists.” Ambiguous market economies or economies in transition, they
play with different rules than those ideally imagined for a free trade world,
and skilfully select legal tools available in the WTO Agreement that could
better protect their syncretic economic model, hence contributing to the
creation of an hybrid system and a possible redefinition of the WTO’s values
and role.
Is this something to worry about or, rather an opportunity for clarification
of the rules of the game? One can indeed wonder wether free trade has
ever existed when the EU or the US keep fighting over the unacceptable
character of their respective highly subsidised industries or agricultures. This
eruption of new players on the commercial scene may lift the veil of
hypocrisy that reigns over an idealised model of international trade that is
not always respected by its main proponents.
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As complainant: 8 cases
DS252 United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (Panel Report circulated on 11 July 2003,
Appellate Body Report circulated on 10 November 2003)
DS368 United States — Preliminary Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations on Coated Free Sheet Paper from China
(Request for Consultations 14 September 2007)
DS379 United States — Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China (Panel Report circulated
on 22 October 2010, Appellate Body Report circulated on 11 March 2011)
DS392 United States — Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China (Panel report circulated on 29 September 2010)
DS397 European Communities — Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (Panel Report circu-
lated on 3 December 2010, Appellate Body Report circulate on 15 July 2011)
DS399 United States — Measures Affecting Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres from China (Panel Report circu-
lated on 13 December 2010, Appellate Body Report circulated on 5 September 2011)
DS405 European Union — Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear from China (Panel Report 28 October 2011)
DS422 United States — Anti-Dumping Measures on Shrimp and Diamond Sawblades from China
As respondent: 23 cases
DS309 China — Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits (Mutually Agreed Solution 6 October 2005)
DS339 China — Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts (Panel Report circulated on 18 July 2008, Appellate Body Report circu-
lated on 15 December 2008)
DS340 China — Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts (Panel Report circulated on 18 July 2008, Appellate Body Report cir-
culated on 15 December 2008)
DS342 China — Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts
DS358 China — Certain Measures Granting Refunds, Reductions or Exemptions from Taxes and Other Payments (Agreement reached in
December 2007)
DS359 China — Certain Measures Granting Refunds, Reductions or Exemptions from Taxes and Other Payments (Agreement reached
on February 2008)
DS362 China — Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (Panel Report circulated on 26 
January 2009)
DS363 China — Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment
Products (Panel Report circulated on 12 August 2009, Appellate Body Report circulated 21 December 2009)
DS372 China — Measures Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial Information Suppliers (complainant EU)
(Agreement reached on December 2008)
DS373 China — Measures Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial Information Suppliers (complainant US)
(Agreement reached on December 2008)
DS378 China — Measures Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial Information Suppliers (complainant Canada)
(Agreement reached on December 2008)
DS387 China — Grants, Loans and Other Incentives (complainant US)
DS388 China — Grants, Loans and Other Incentives (complainant Mexico)
DS390 China — Grants, Loans and Other Incentives (complainant Guatemala)
DS394 China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (Complainant US) (Panel Report circulated on 5 July
2011, Appellate Body Report circulated on 30 January 2012)
DS395 China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (complainant UE) (Panel Report circulated 5 July 2011,
Appellate Body Report circulated 30 January 2012)
DS398 China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (complainant Mexico) (Panel Report circulated on 5
July 2011 Appellate, Body Report circulated on 30 January 2012)
DS407 China — Provisional Anti-Dumping Duties on Certain Iron and Steel Fasteners from the European Union
DS413 China — Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services (Panel established in March 2011)
DS414 China — Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-rolled Electrical Steel from the United States
DS419 China — Measures concerning wind power equipment (complainant US) 
DS425 China — Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on X-Ray Security Inspection Equipment from the European Union
DS427 China — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on Broiler Products from the United States
Source: www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm (consulted on 25 February 2012).
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Annex 2 – China’s Protocol of Accession Paragraph 16*
Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard Mechanism
1. In cases where products of Chinese origin are being imported into the territory of any WTO Member in such increased quantities or under such conditions as
to cause or threaten to cause market disruption to the domestic producers of like or directly competitive products, the WTO Member so affected may request
consultations with China with a view to seeking a mutually satisfactory solution, including whether the affected WTO Member should pursue application of a
measure under the Agreement on Safeguards. Any such request shall be notified immediately to the Committee on Safeguards.
2. If, in the course of these bilateral consultations, it is agreed that imports of Chinese origin are such a cause and that action is necessary, China shall take such
action as to prevent or remedy the market disruption. Any such action shall be notified immediately to the Committee on Safeguards.
3. If consultations do not lead to an agreement between China and the WTO Member concerned within 60 days of the receipt of a request for consultations, the
WTO Member affected shall be free, in respect of such products, to withdraw concessions or otherwise to limit imports only to the extent necessary to prevent
or remedy such market disruption. Any such action shall be notified immediately to the Committee on Safeguards.
4. Market disruption shall exist whenever imports of an article, like or directly competitive with an article produced by the domestic industry, are increasing
rapidly, either absolutely or relatively, so as to be a significant cause of material injury, or threat of material injury to the domestic industry. In determining if
market disruption exists, the affected WTO Member shall consider objective factors, including the volume of imports, the effect of imports on prices for like
or directly competitive articles, and the effect of such imports on the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products.
5. Prior to application of a measure pursuant to paragraph 3, the WTO Member taking such action shall provide reasonable public notice to all interested parties
and provide adequate opportunity for importers, exporters and other interested parties to submit their views and evidence on the appropriateness of the pro-
posed measure and whether it would be in the public interest. The WTO Member shall provide written notice of the decision to apply a measure, including the
reasons for such measure and its scope and duration.
6. A WTO Member shall apply a measure pursuant to this Section only for such period of time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the market disruption.
If a measure is taken as a result of a relative increase in the level of imports, China has the right to suspend the application of substantially equivalent concessions
or obligations under the GATT 1994 to the trade of the WTO Member applying the measure, if such measure remains in effect more than two years. However,
if a measure is taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports, China has a right to suspend the application of substantially equivalent concessions or ob-
ligations under the GATT 1994 to the trade of the WTO Member applying the measure, if such measure remains in effect more than three years. Any such
action by China shall be notified immediately to the Committee on Safeguards.
7. In critical circumstances, where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair, the WTO Member so affected may take a provisional safeguard
measure pursuant to a preliminary determination that imports have caused or threatened to cause market disruption. In this case, notification of the measures
taken to the Committee on Safeguards and a request for bilateral consultations shall be effected immediately thereafter. The duration of the provisional
measure shall not exceed 200 days during which the pertinent requirements of paragraphs 1, 2 and 5 shall be met. The duration of any provisional measure
shall be counted toward the period provided for under paragraph 6.
8. If a WTO Member considers that an action taken under paragraphs 2, 3 or 7 causes or threatens to cause significant diversions of trade into its market, it may
request consultations with China and/or the WTO Member concerned. Such consultations shall be held within 30 days after the request is notified to the
Committee on Safeguards. If such consultations fail to lead to an agreement between China and the WTO Member or Members concerned within 60 days
after the notification, the requesting WTO Member shall be free, in respect of such product, to withdraw concessions accorded to or otherwise limit imports
from China, to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy such diversions. Such action shall be notified immediately to the Committee on Safeguards.
9. Application of this Section shall be terminated 12 years after the date of accession.
* Document retrieved from WTO website: http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/432.doc (consulted on 23 March 2012).
